As entirely new technologies have developed over the past two centuries, US patent law has struggled with questions over whether that type of technology should be protectable by patent grants, and if so, to what extent. Historically, this issue was presented with the development of life-changing technologies like the telegraph and telephones. More recently, the challenge has been presented with the development of computers and software, financial innovation, the Internet and e-commerce applications. We also see these challenges arising in the life sciences with new methods to diagnose and treat diseases, as well as the isolation and mutation of human and animal genes to create new medical treatments. These types of new development have always presented a theoretical strain on the underlying rationale for the US patent system, and today is no exception. This article seeks to provide some guidance on the current state of the law, with its evolving and constantly changing standards, and provide tips and best practices on how to navigate the turbulent waters for determining patent-eligibility.
As entirely new technologies have developed over the past two centuries, US patent law has struggled with questions over whether that type of technology should be protectable by patent grants, and if so, to what extent. Historically, this issue was presented with the development of life-changing technologies like the telegraph and telephones. More recently, the challenge has been presented with the development of computers and software, financial innovation, the Internet and e-commerce applications. We also see these challenges arising in the life sciences with new methods to diagnose and treat diseases, as well as the isolation and mutation of human and animal genes to create new medical treatments. These types of new development have always presented a theoretical strain on the underlying rationale for the US patent system, and today is no exception. This article seeks to provide some guidance on the current state of the law, with its evolving and constantly changing standards, and provide tips and best practices on how to navigate the turbulent waters for determining patent-eligibility. 2 At this time the world of patent law saw a seismic change that seemed to put most challenges to patent-eligibility to rest. Conventional wisdom among patent practitioners at that time was that, unless the invention did not work or sought to claim some impossibility (like the legendary perpetual motion machine), patent-eligibility under 35 USC §101 was essentially a non-issue. While traditionalists at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) sought to advance previously discredited patent-eligibility challenges like 'technological arts' † Although the patent statutes have traditionally been interpreted to give a broad scope to include as patent-eligible subject matter including 'anything under the sun that is made by man' , there are three judicial exceptions (sometimes referred to as 'fundamental principles'): laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas. Upon the introduction of innovations closely harnessing these fundamental principles, such as computers and biotechnology, US courts have struggled to develop a consistent approach to distinguish patents pre-empting these patent-ineligible fundamental principles from patent-eligible inventive applications using these fundamental principles. † The US Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected judges' attempts to create rigid rules to use when evaluating claims which potentially claim a fundamental principle. After the US Supreme Court's most recent decision in Mayo v Prometheus, it is clear that a patent claim may contain a fundamental principle as long as that principle is not pre-empted, but patent-eligibility still remains a complicated issue that must be examined on a case-by-case basis. This article seeks to provide some guidance on the current state of the law, with its evolving and constantly changing standards, and provide tips and best practices on how to navigate the turbulent waters for determining patent-eligibility.
Development of the current patenteligibility debate
objections, 3 patent-eligibility under Section 101 did not seem to be a significant barrier to obtaining patent protection (though specific legal bars like claim  breadth and clarity under 35 USC  §112, novelty under  35 USC  §102 and non-obviousness under 35 USC  §103 continued to remain the main thresholds of patentability at the USPTO and in the courts).
However, as public scepticism of patents began to grow in the wake of State Street and AT&T, these seemingly calm waters began to stir. This scepticism took many forms. For example, the press in numerous articles focused on seemingly silly patents, 4 like methods of swinging on a swing 5 or methods of making a crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich.
6 Distrust in the patent system was also encouraged by news reports on patent owners who were enforcing what many thought were dubious quality patents, like the Amazon.com's 'one click' ordering process 7 and the Y2K 'fix' patent. 8 Even the US Congress took action in 1999 by creating special 'prior user rights' for 'business method patents' to address issues raised by the lack of prior art for patents now deemed patent-eligible in view of State Street.
9
By 2004, although the issue of patent-eligibility seemed well settled in the district and appellate courts, a split developed within the USPTO, which was being faced with an overwhelming number of patent applications, a growing backlog and ever-increasing public scrutiny. First, in the precedential decision of Ex Parte Lundgren, the US Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ('the Board') seemed to sound the death knell in the so-called 'technological arts' rejections under 35 USC §101. 10 However, soon thereafter, in a non-precedential decision, Ex parte Bilski, the question of patenteligibility was rephrased in the form of what was to be characterized as the 'machine-or-transformation' test.
11
After Ex parte Bilski, the Board increasingly began to issue decisions challenging the patent-eligibility of patent claims, 12 resulting in these issues being presented to the Federal Circuit. 13 The debate was further fuelled by hints in concurring and dissenting opinions from the US Supreme Court Justices indicating their scepticism of the 'useful, concrete and tangible result' test set forth in State Street and 'dubious quality' patents that resulted.
14 In 2008, the patent-eligibility question faced a showdown at the Federal Circuit, with the full court hearing the issue in In re Bilski. 15 By this time, the US Supreme Court had sent a clear message to the Federal Circuit that it was carefully monitoring their jurisprudence, and did not like 'rigid rules' (eg the Federal Circuit requirement for an explicit teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine prior art for obviousness determinations was rejected, as was the Federal Circuit endorsement of automatic injunctions at the end of patent cases). 16 Likewise, US Congress had repeatedly considered efforts to 'reform' patent law legislatively to address seemingly pro-patent sentiments of the Federal Circuit. The number of amici submissions (briefs offered to the court by volunteers not party to the case in order to assist the court in making its decision) submitted to the Federal Circuit was overwhelming, and heavily divided, with contrary positions being offered Rec S14715 (daily edn, 17 November 1999). 10 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ2d 1385, 1388 (BPAI 2005): 'Our determination is that there is currently no judicially recognized separate "technological arts" test to determine patent eligible subject matter under Section 101. We decline to create one. Therefore, it is apparent that the examiner's rejection can not be sustained.' (emphasis added). 20 The majority, under a stated effort to comply with US Supreme Court precedent on patent-eligibility, attempted to draw a bright-line rule on the scope of patent-eligibility using the so-called 'machine-or-transformation' test. 21 The Federal Circuit's decision, with nine members of the Federal Circuit supporting the majority opinion, nonetheless resulted in four concurring and/or dissenting opinions which evidenced the divided and wide ranging views held by the Judges of the Federal Circuit on this subject.
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The issue did not rest with this seemingly authoritative decision of the Federal Circuit. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari, and heard arguments on the patent-eligibility of Messrs Bilski and Warsaw's claims the following term. While, technically, the majority decision in Bilski v Kappos 23 affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision to find the claims not patent-eligible, the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the machine-ortransformation test as the 'sole' test for patent-eligibility Table 1 . Tips when Drafting Patent-Eligible Claims. In view of the recent developments in patent-eligibility laws, and the changing contours of the principles governing this issue, we recommend the following best practices to draft patent-eligible claims that can withstand PTO and judicial scrutiny: 
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The Federal Circuit's reaction to Bilski
After Bilski the Federal Circuit was at first slow to address the patent-eligibility issue and sought to avoid the issue when possible. When the Federal Circuit did address the issue, different panels showed different approaches to the patent-eligibility issues. For example, Table 2 . Patent-eligibility factors.
The PTO, while noting in its latest guidelines that the 'machine-or-transformation test' is not determinative under Mayo, a has identified the following factors that Examiners should consider as weighing towards patent-eligibility: panels on which Judge Dyk participated applied a restrictive approach to patent-eligible subject matter, holding that §101 'is . . . a threshold test'. 27 While his decisions paid lip service to patent-eligibility principles having a broad scope, he nonetheless applied this threshold as a finer sieve than other panels at the Federal Circuit. 28 While the machine-or-transformation test was considered in these opinions, as directed by the US Supreme Court in Bilski, the §101 analysis looked beyond the outcome of that test. 29 Similarly, Judge Prost's §101 analysis has adopted a narrower view of patent-eligibility. Her application of the machine-or-transformation test required the use of a machine in a claim to impart 'meaningful limits on the claim's scope' to transform the claim into a patent-eligible practical application of a fundamental principle. 30 Further, in her analysis, the fact that claims are tied to the physical world-via tangible means such as commodities, money or real property-was found to be insufficient to avoid a claim being found as drawn to an abstract idea. 31 Judge Rader has expressed greater reluctance to use patent-eligibility as to invalidate patent claims: 'This court [the Federal Circuit] should decline to accept invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility.' 32 In his view, §101 should only be applied as a 'coarse filter' , such that claims should not be found invalid under §101 unless those claims are so manifestly abstract 'as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act'. 33 Judge Newman has joined with Judge Rader in expressing this broader view of patent-eligibility. 34 Judge Plager has argued for judicial restraint in addressing the patent-eligibility issues. He has stated that 'as a matter of efficient judicial process' , patenteligibility under §101 should not be considered 'unless absolutely necessary' . 35 Instead, he is of the opinion that courts should 'initially address patent invalidity' under statutory 'conditions of patentability' (which, in his view, do not include §101) rather than 'foray into the jurisprudential morass of §101' . 36 He suggests that courts avoid the difficulties of §101, which, for example, asks courts to attempt to define an 'abstract idea' , and instead exercise their inherent power to control the processes of litigation when the case can be decided by more specific statutes, such as Sections 102, 103 and 112. 37 The US Supreme Court's second look after Bilski
The judges of the Federal Circuit had a further opportunity for feedback on their §101 standpoints when the US Supreme Court granted certiorari to Mayo Collaborative Servs v Prometheus Labs, Inc and delivered yet another criticism of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence on patent-eligibility.
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In Mayo the US Supreme Court set forth its latest pronouncement on patent-eligibility under 35 USC §101. Mayo did not suggest that the court intended to alter in any way its controlling analytical framework. Instead, it reiterated the same two-step analysis confirmed by the court in Bilski and held that this analysis must be applied to all patent-eligibility inquiries: † Does the claimed subject matter fall within one of the four statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter: (i) process, (ii) machine, (iii) manufacture or (iv) composition of matter? † Is the claimed subject matter directed to one of three so-called 'fundamental principles,' ie laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas? 39 Mayo maintained that patent-eligibility should be defined under §101's four categories of statutory subject matter and, importantly, did not overturn the holding in Diamond v Chakrabarty that patent-eligibility be broadly construed to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man'. 40 Mayo also continued to limit the judicial exceptions of patent-eligible subject matter to the same three 'fundamental principles' set forth in its prior precedent: (1) laws of nature; (2) natural phenomena; and (3) abstract ideas. 41 Mayo continues to reject shortcut analyses on patenteligibility, and specifically rejected the machine-or-transformation test as a dispositive test of patent-eligibility. 42 As to the second step, which was the primary focus of the Mayo court's analysis, the US Supreme Court again confirmed that, while a claim may not pre-empt a 'fundamental principle', it may nonetheless be drawn to an 'application' of a fundamental principle. 43 But the difficulty, as the Federal Circuit and the US Supreme Court have repeatedly recognized, is to understand what 'more' is necessary 'to transform an unpatentable [fundamental principle] into a patent-eligible application of such [a fundamental principle]'. 44 Mayo recognized that the same guideposts set forth for determining if a claim is directed to an abstract principle, apply with equal force to other categories of 'fundamental principles', like 'laws of nature' and 'natural phenomena'. 45 Accordingly, consistent with its prior precedent, Mayo found that certain types of 'more' were not enough to transform a patent-ineligible fundamental principle into a patent-eligible application of that principle: † Simply saying 'apply it' , without more, is insufficient; 46 † While still a 'useful clue' , a fundamental principle merely tied to a machine or transformed in some manner is not necessarily dispositive; 47 and † The mere inclusion of field-of-use limitations or the addition of token extra-solutional components is inadequate. 48 Applying these guideposts, Mayo found the claims at issue to be patent-ineligible because they covered a fundamental principle (ie a law of nature), and did not add enough 'more' to be a practical application of that law of nature. 49 After Mayo, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded two of the Federal Circuit's recent decisions on patent-eligibility. 50 As a result, the US Supreme Court seemed to send two messages to the Federal Circuit. First, the principles that the US Supreme Court has announced with respect to patenteligibility of 'abstract ideas' are equally applicable to 'natural phenomena' and 'laws of nature', and vice versa. 54 A claim that merely pre-empts one of these 'fundamental principles', even if in the form of a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, is not patent-eligible. Thus, in Benson, Flook and Bilski, the claims were found to pre-empt abstract ideas. Benson found the claim sought to pre-empt the abstract idea of using an algorithm to convert binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals to pure binary numerals. 55 Flook found the claim sought to pre-empt the abstract idea of using an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value. 56 Bilski found the claim sought to pre-empt the abstract idea of hedging risk. 57 Most recently, in Mayo, the US Supreme Court found the claim sought to preempt the law of nature relating to a specific correlation used to diagnose and/or treat a disease. 58 The fact that a claim may contain an algorithm, or reference to a law of nature or natural phenomena, does not preclude the claim from patent-eligibility. 59 As Mayo reaffirmed: 'For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.' 60 Thus the US Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a patent claim which claims (or pre-empts) a fundamental principle in the abstract, which is not patent-eligible, and a patent claim directed to a practical application of a fundamental principle, which is patent-eligible. 61 In drawing this distinction, the US Supreme Court has noted that the difficulty in determining patenteligibility is discerning what 'more' is sufficient to establish that the patent is drawn to a practical application of the fundamental principle rather than pre-empting the principle itself. 62 Simply saying 'apply it', without more, is insufficient. 63 Restricting an abstract idea to one particular field of use is also not enough to make a claim patent-eligible. 64 Likewise, the mere inclusion of token or '[p]urely "conventional or obvious"' extra-solution activity is inadequate. 65 And, while still a 'useful clue' , a fundamental principle merely tied (albeit meaningfully) to a machine or transformed in some manner is not necessarily dispositive. 66 In Bilski and Mayo the US Supreme Court used an approach in which the claim being analysed is compared against previously analysed claims to see if the claim is more like the patent-ineligible claims found in, for example, Benson, Flook and Bilski, or the patenteligible claim found in Diehr.
67 A similar approach has been used by district courts since Bilski.
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The debate remains open
There will no doubt continue to be turbulence in the patent-eligibility waters for years to come. It appears, at least for now, that any effort to create a bright-line rule on patent-eligibility will ultimately be rejected by the US Supreme Court, which continues to keeps its watchful eye on this issue. Whether vague, subjective value guidelines on patent-eligibility (or other inquiries of patentability) truly advance the US Constitutional goals of 'promoting progress of the Arts' is open for debate. But, at least as of today, the debate remains open, and the potential (and risk) associated with patenting Information Age technology and twenty-first century life science advancements remains large and widespread, as does the risk of not seeking patents in such areas.
